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The purpose of this thesis is to test Rebecca L. Schiff' s "Theory of Concordance" 
against the case of Argentina. Using the case study method to determine whether this 
neglected theory of civil-military relations accounts for the occurrence of military 
interventions in Argentina, this thesis also examines whether the theory provides a better 
tool than separation theory by which to analyze civil-military relations in Latin America 
Separation theory describes the separation of civil and military institutions as it occurs in 
the United States and suggests that it is the ideal model for other nations to emulate. 
Concordance theory argues that three partners-the military, the political elites, and the 
citizenry -should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve 
separation, but does not require it. What is interesting about this theory is that it accounts 
for the U.S. model as well. The thesis concludes that in the case of Argentina, separation 
theory better predicts the mechanisms by which a civilian government may establish . 
control over its formerly interventionist military. However, with modification, 
concordance theory may provide insights into how that control may be maintained 
following the transition to enduring democracy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As more nations are transitioning to democratic models than at any time since the 
Second World War, "democratic peace theory" has become the centerpiece of U.S. 
foreign policy. This is based on the theory that democracies, generally speaking, do not 
fight other democracies. Given that these transitions to democracy are from former 
authoritarian regimes with interventionist. militaries, the topic of civil-military relations has 
reemerged as a vital subject of debate and study. Rebecca L. Schiff notes that "a major 
conclusion of current civil-military relations theory is that militaries should remain 
physically and ideologically separated from political institutions." 
Separation theory descnoos the separation of civil and military institutions as it 
occurs in the United States and suggests that it is the ideal model for other nations to 
emulate. Rebecca L. Schiff offers an alternative theory of concordance that argues that 
three partners--the military, the political elites, and the citizency--should aim for a 
cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation, but does not require it. 
This theory, as opposed to the U.S. model of separation, allows for a high level of 
integration between the military and other parts of society, as only one of several types of 
civil-military relationships. What is interesting about this theory is that it accounts for the 
U.S. model as well. 
Just as there are many versions of democracy, Schiff argues that there may exist 
various types of civil-military relationships and that these arrangements are rooted in the 
cultural and historical experiences of the nations they serve. Concordance theory relies on 
the agreement of the ''three social partners" with respect to ''four indicators": the social 
ix 
composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment 
method, and military style. If there is general acceptance among the partners with respect 
to these indicators, then the likelihood of military interventions is diminished. The theory 
has the additional value of explaining the institutional and cuhural conditions that affect 
relations with the military. 
The pmpose of this thesis is to test Rebecca L. Schiff's ''Theory of Concordance" 
against the case of Argentina. I use the case study method to determine whether this 
relatively neglected theory of civil-military relations accounts for the occurrence of 
military interventions in the past and the subsequent return to democracy. Secondary to 
this, I examine whether the theory provides a better tool than separation theory by which 
to analyze civil-military relations in this case and the suitability of its generalization to 
other cases both within Latin America and trans-regionally. 
The bulk ofSchiff's work on this topic has been focused on the states oflsrael and 
India. An original aspect of this thesis is that it represents the first time that concordance 
theory has been tested against a Latin American case. Due to historical, cultural, and 
social differences with Schiff' s cases, Argentina serves as an ideal test case for the 
"Theory of Concordance" within the context of the Latin American arena. 
The following provides a brief description of the organization of the chapters of 
this thesis. Chapter I is the introduction. Chapter Il provides a review of the current state 
of civil-military relations (C:MR) theory. Chapter ID introduces "concordance theory'' and 
lays the groundwork for the testing of the theory in subsequent chapters. Chapter IV, 
explores the historical and cultural background of the Argentine case in order to highlight 
x 
why current theory (based within the context of the U.S. experience) may not necessarily 
apply to Argentina. Chapter V focuses on testing the case of Argentina against Schiff's 
theory of concordance. Chapter VI concludes with a summary of the findings. 
My primary criticism of concordance theory is a methodological one. Simply put, 
I am not certain that the phenomena observed in the case of Argentina (or in Schiff's cases 
of Israel and India) are necessarily the result of agreement or disagreement among the 
"three partners" with respect to the four indicators of concordance. The one part of 
concordance theory that seems to hold promise is its core argument against current 
civil-military relations theory. Unlike current CMR theory-with a focus on its 
western-bound, dichotomous, and institutional nature-the theory of concordance 
highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, 
the political elites, and society. It is a1most unthinkable that current CMR theory would 
apply without modification in a Latin American case. Yet, in the case of Argentina, 
Huntington's prescription for separation and professionaliz.ation of the military seems to 
have worked in the period since 1983. However, it would be unlikely that such 
prescriptions would have been viable in the period prior to the return to democracy, due to 
the historical and cultural context of the time. 
I argue that each nation must find its own way to democratic forms. Once 
memories of old patterns of authoritarianism have been supplanted by more democratic 




A. SETTING THE STAGE 
With the end of the Cold War and the attendant loss of the central strategic 
paradigm--<;ontainment-scholars, statesmen, and soldiers alike have struggled to 
redefine the realities of the "new world order." This change has manifested itself in 
different ways. As more nations are transitioning to democratic models than at any time 
since the Second World War, "democratic peace theory'' has become the centerpiece of 
U.S. foreign policy. This is based on the theory that democracies, generally speaking, do 
not fight other democracies. Given that these transitions to democracy are from former 
authoritarian regimes with interventionist militaries, the topic of civil-military relations has 
reemerged as a vital subject of debate and study. Rebecca L. Schiff notes that "a major 
conclusion of current civil-military relations theory is that militaries should remain 
physically and ideologically separated from political institutions. "1 
Separation theory descn"bes the separation of civil and military institutions as it 
occurs in the United States and suggests that it is the ideal model for other nations to 
emulate. 2 Rebecca L. Schiff offers an alternative theory of concordance that argues that 
three partners-the military, the political elites, and the citizenry-should aim for a 
cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation, but does not require it. 
Rebecca L. Schiff: ''Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces 
and Society 22, no. 1 (fall 1995): 7. 
2 For extensive discussion of this theory see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 
(Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 189-192. 
1 
This theory, as opposed to the U.S. model of separation, allows for a high level of 
integration between the military and other parts of society, as only one of several types of 
civil-military relationships. What is interesting about this theory is that it accounts for the 
U.S. model as well. 
Just as there are many versions of democracy, Schiff argues that there may exist 
various types of civil-military relationships and that these arrangements are rooted in the 
cultural and historical experiences of the nations they serve. Concordance theory relies on 
the agreement of the ''three social partners" with respect to ''four indicators": the social 
composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment 
method, and military style. If there is general acceptance among the partners with respect 
to these indicators, then the likelihood of military interventions is diminished. The theory 
has the additional value of explaining the institutional and cultural conditions that affect 
relations with the military. 
The purpose of this thesis is to test Rebecca L. Schiff's "Theory of Concordance" 
against the case of Argentina. I will use the case study method to determine whether this 
relatively neglected theory of civil-military relations accounts for the occurrence of 
.military interventions in the past and the subsequent return to democracy. Secondary to 
this, I will examine whether the theory provides a better tool than separation theory by 
which to analyze civil-military relations in this case and the suitability of its generalization 
to other cases both within Latin America and trans-regionally. 
The bulk ofSchiff's work on this topic has been focused on the states oflsrael and 
India. An original aspect of this thesis is that it represents the :first time that concordance 
2 
theory has been tested against a Latin American case. I have specifically selected 
Argentina because, while it has experienced both military interventions and returns to 
democracy, it represents a different sociopolitical experience than the cases Schiff has 
explored. In the case of Argentina, the colonial experience was Spanish and centralist. 
Argentina has habitually produced "personalistic" presidents who wield disproportionate 
power. These early experiences have continued to the present and affect the nature of 
politics, society, and the civil-military relationship in the case. Due to historical, cultural, 
and social differences with Schiff' s cases, Argentina should serve as an ideal test case for 
Schiff's "Theory of Concordance" within the context of the Latin American arena. 
B. ABOUT DEFINITIONS 
In order to avoid repetitive discussion of the meaning of various terms within the 
body of this text, I offer the following definitions. They represent the most important 
concepts used in this thesis. Some have specific significance for Latin America. I do not 
claim that these are the only definitions possible or even that they are the best available. 
Rather, they help to set the stage for the discussion that follows. 
Separation or "Objective Civilian Control" Theory refers to the widely held 
premise that militaries need to remain physically and ideologically separated from political 
institutions. Originally coined by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State, 
"objective civilian control" involves: 
1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of 
the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the 
military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign 
3 
and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area 
of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the 
minimiz.ation of military intervention in politics and of political intervention by the 
military.3 
Concordance Theory is based on the argument that there may exist various types 
of civil-military relationships and that these arrangements are rooted in the cultural and 
historical experiences of the nations they serve. Concordance theory relies on the 
agreement of the three social partners--the military, the political elite, and the 
citiz.enry-with respect to four indicators: The social composition of the officer corps, the 
political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. If there is 
general acceptance among the partners with respect to these indicators, then the likelihood 
of military interventions is diminished.4 
Presidentialism is defined as "a governmental system in which the president 
dominates all institutions of government and is the major locus of political power in the 
country." Although most Latin American nations patterned their constitutions on the U.S. 
modei years of authoritarian regimes and constitutional tampering have weakened the 
separation of powers and centralized them in the office of the president. This is further 
compounded by Latin cultural tendencies toward personalism, centraliz.ed power, and 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Civil-Military Relations and 
Democracy eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 3-4. 
4 
"Concordance theory," by not excluding democratic or democratizing nations with a long tradition of 
civilian control over the military, and by allowing for the U.S. model of "separation," is actually more 
comprehensive than separation theory. See Schi~ "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 7-10. 
4 
weak political parties. 5 
Populism or Populist Presidencies are those administrations that claim to 
represent the common people and draw their power from what is often a charismatic 
appeal to the masses. 
Centralized Government from a Latin American perspective is the direct control 
of the nation from the capital city. Central government exercises much more political 
power than that of state or provincial governments. Political power is centered there and . 
decisions emanate outward. The phenomenon is thought to be the resuh of the legacy of 
Spanish and Portuguese rule in the New World. Although there is much variation in the 
degree of centralism among Latin American countries, the phenomenon is widespread.6 
Federalism is defined as "a political system that constitutionally divides the 
powers and functions of government between central and regional governments." 
However, although considered a federal union, Argentina is dominated by a central 
government. 7 
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism is a distinctly exclusionary and non-democratic 
system of government. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level 
technocrats-;nilitary and civilian, both within and outside the state-working in 
association with foreign sources of capital. This new elite eliminates electoral competition 
5 Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Plano, Latin America: A Political Dictionary (Oxford, England: 
ABC-CLIO, 1992), 137. 
6 Ibid., 24-25. 
7 Ibid., 130-131. 
5 
and controls the political participation of the popular sector. Public policy is concentrated 
on the promotion of advanced industrialization. The technocrats have a low level of 
tolerance for the ongoing political and economic crises and perceive high levels of popular 
sector politicization as an obstacle to economic growth and eventually form a coalition 
that ultimately establishes a repressive bureaucratic authoritarian system. The term was 
popularized by Guillermo O'Donnell who examined the cases of Brazil in the post-1964 
period and Argentina from 1966 to 1970 and from 1976 to 1983.8 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISi) is a strategy of economic 
development intended to reverse the trend of external dependency on imported goods. 
The intent is to raise tariffs on imports while replacing the production of the same items 
with domestic production. The first part of the implementation is known as the "easy 
phase" because domestic demand for the goods is great due to the relatively high cost of 
imports. Once the domestic market has been exhauste~ however, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to continue growth because protectionist government policies have made the 
goods uncompetitive on the international market. In Latin America this situation led to 
· high inflation, balance of payment problems, high unemployment and a crisis in the 
populist governments that created ISi. In the wake of these failed policies, bureaucratic 
authoritarian type regimes emerged in many cases and set about to "deepen" 
industrializ.ation through the domestic manufacture of consumer durables and intermediate 
and capital goods. This required larger, more efficient, and highly capitalized enterprises, 
8 David Collier, ''The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model." 1'he New Authoritarianism in Latin America 
ed. David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 24-28. 
6 
often the affiliates of multinational corporations. 
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following provides a brief description of the organization of the chapters of 
this thesis. Chapter II provides a review of the current state of civil-military relations 
(CMR) theory. Since the current literature is dominated by those who support separation 
theory, I will begin with an explanation of that theory. Further, I will show how the 
theory is tied to an ethnocentric view of the U.S. cultural, social and historical experience. 
Finally, I will critique the theory on the grounds that it is not comprehensive enough, that 
it does not allow that different experiences will breed different civil-military relations, and 
that few alternatives to separation theory have been developed and tested. 
Chapter ID introduces "concordance theory" and lays the groundwork for the 
testing of the theory in subsequent chapters. Here I will rely heavily on the limited 
theoretical work of Rebecca L. Schiff to explain the intent of the theory and to define the 
variables fundamental to it. 
In Chapter IV, I will explore the historical and cultural background of the 
Argentine case in order to highlight why current theory (based within the context of the 
U.S. experience) may not necessarily apply to Argentina. Central to Schiff's theory is that 
different civil-military relationships are the result of different historical and cultural 
experiences. 
Chapter V will focus on testing the case of Argentina against Schiff's theory of 
concordance. Here I will determine whether concordance existed between the ''three 
7 
partners" with respect to the four indicators during the periods prior to the last military 
coup and at the time of the most recent return to democracy. By testing the case at these 
two critical times, I intend to: 1) determine the validity of Schiff's theory in two Latin 
American cases; and 2) identify any weaknesses in the theory. 
In Chapter VI, I will conclude this thesis with a summary of my findings. 
Additionally, I will critique "concordance" theory by examining any weaknesses and 
explore the. possibility that other factors may better explain the phenomena observed. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications of my findings for CMR theory. 
8 
II. REVIEW OF CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (CMR) 
THEORY 
A. CURRENTTBEORY 
1. Ascendency of Separation Theory 
Since its theoretical ascendency in the 1950s and 1960s, the idea of separation 
between civilian and military institutions has become the dominant paradigm of 
civil-military (CMR) literature. Some scholars of this period emphasized the problems 
with militaries abroad that seemed dominant at the time, including "supplantment," coup, 
and blackmail. 9 Other scholars of the period focused on the positive contnbutions of 
militaries to domestic political and economic development. However, the bulk of the 
literature clearly centered on the threat that militaries posed to their governments and 
societies and prescn"bed strict separation as the remedy to domestic coercion and 
dominance by the military. 10 
Given the context of the time in which the debate unfolded, civil-military relations 
theorist and theory became ~ted on the issue of how a civilian government controls its 
9 For an example of this perspective and discussion of various forms of domestic military intervention, 
see Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 78-79. 
10 See the analysis of Lucian Pye and Guy Pauker in contrast to that of Samuel Huntington and Morris 
Janowitz. Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Moderniz.ation," in The Role of the Military in 
Underdev.eloped Countries, ed. J.J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 69; Guy 
Pauker, ''Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics, 11, 1959; Samuel 
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 222; and 
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964). 
9 
military .11 The debate over this question oscillated between Samuel Huntington's 
answer-maximizing military professionalism-and his chief antagonist from the 
sociological schooi Morris Janowitz, who offered an essentially similar answer. 12 
Dovetailed with the concept of separation is the position of the Structural Realist school 
of thinkers who ''believe that the international environment in general and a nation's 
external threat condition in particular greatly influence domestic politics. "13 Central to 
their analysis is that nations with high external threat conditions are more prone to military 
intervention in politics than those with lower external threats. 
In this chapter, I will examine the arguments for each of these theoretical points of 
view in order to lay the groundwork for a general critique of their shortcomings prior to 
introducing Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance. 
2. Huntington's School of Separation 
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington descn"bes the modem military profession 
in light of both theoretical and historical perspectives. Specifically, he examines the 
relation between the state and the officer corps. Like Samuel Finer, Huntington 
11 The period 1958-1775 witnessed a net reduction in the number of democratic regimes. Samuel 
Huntington referred to this as the second reverse wave and documented 22 cases. See Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 14-16. 
12 Peter D. Feaver, ''The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control," Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (winter 1996): 149. 
13 Schiff: "Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces and 
Society 22, no. 1 (fall 1995): 8. 
IO 
establishes the ''tension" that exists between society and its military institutions: "military 
institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming 
from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social 
forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society."14 To mitigate this inherent 
conflict, Huntington argues that the state requires an officer corps composed of 
professionals who view themselves as morally obligated to subordinate themselves to 
civilian control. 15 
On an intuitive leve~ this subordination to civilian control is not necessarily a 
natural occurrence in the evolution of statehood or the transition to democracy. The 
relationship between the state and the military is not a balance between equal entities. The 
underlying truth is that the ultimate repository of the threat of the use of violence resides 
in the hands of the officer corps rather than with the established government. As Eric 
Nordlinger points out, "a unified officer corps is virtually always capable of maintaining a 
civilian government in office, or taking control itself."16 The implication, from 
Huntington's view, is that the officer corps must be imbued with a perspective of 
~ivil-military relations as an ethical issue and must focus on respect for civilian control as a 
moral obligation rather than depending sole upon legal or institutional frameworks. 17 This 
14 Samuel P. HWltington, TheSoldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2. 
15 Ibid., 78. 
16 Eric A Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1977), 5. 
17 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 260-264. 
11 
becomes a critical issue when the officer corps is faced with weak, corrupt, or self-serving 
civilian leadership. A bureaucratic, managerial, nationalistic military officer corps may 
decide, given such a circumstance, that intervention is in the best interest of the nation. 
Given the imbalance of relative power between civilian government and the 
military, the only option is to minimize military power. Huntington identifies two ways to 
do this-both of which involve separation: ''subjective" or "objective" civilian control. 
"Subjective" civilian control relies on legal or institutional mechanisms to reduce military 
power. It achieves its goal by "civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the 
state.'~18 In this form of control, military budgets are cut, a "down-sizing" is imposed, and 
the military is directed to conduct a myriad of operations that would normally be civilian 
responsibilities. 
Directly opposed to this, "objective" civilian control is less rigid and can only 
occur in the presence of a professional military establishment. By "militarizing the 
military," objective control seeks to turn the military into "the tool of the state" by 
allowing the military a certain amount of autonomy in exchange for nonintervention in the 
political arena. Huntington observes that this type of control is only possible since the 
emergence of the military as a profession and that subjective control is "out of place in any 
society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a 
distinct class of specialists in the management of violence. 19 
18 Ibid., 80-82. 
19 Ibid., 83-85. 
12 
While Nordlinger does not approach the idea of civilian control as Huntington 
does, still .he identifies three models of civilian control over the military: the traditional, the 
liberal, and the penetration model. While the traditional model falls neatly into 
Huntington's subjective category, the hberal model "is explicitly premised upon the 
differentiation of elites according to their expertise and responsibilities."20 This is precisely 
the situation for which Huntington would prescnbe subjective control. Like Huntington, 
Nordlinger displays a preference for the penetration model as "a powerful one for 
buttressing civilian control." However, the penetration model does not focus on the 
professionaliz.ation of the force. Rather, it seeks to reduce military power by 
"penetrating" it with political ideology and personnel. Norlinger warns of the difficulty of 
implementing the penetration model upon an established military organiz.ation, 21 however, 
military power may be decreased by creating pressure on the institution through force 
reductions, implementation of social engineering, shifting emphasis on training and 
operations away from war :fighting. In such an environment, the military might likely tum 
on itself or intervene in politics as it is tom by both fiscal and morale issues. 
3. Structural Realist School 
Whereas separation theory's central focus of analysis is on domestic politics, 
proponents of the Structural Realist school posit that a nation's external threat condition 
20 Nordlinger, 11-15. 
21 Ibid., 15-17. 
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and the international environment dominate domestic politics. Thus, countries that 
experience high external threat conditions are more prone to domestic military 
interventions. Likewise, a military that is active on the domestic front also has a 
propensity for intervention, as illustrated by Harold Lasswell's theory of the "garrison 
state."22 
If one accepts that all state organization was originally organization for war 
(against external threats), then by.studying historical patterns of civil-military relations, we 
can recognize and manage the uneasy balance between the need for security and order and 
the desire for individual h"berty and civilian supremacy over the military. While the 
problem of establishing institutionalized civilian control over politicized military 
establishments is most acute for emerging democracies, the struggle continues following 
democratic consolidation. Just as democracy is not an end state but rather a process, 
civil-military relations are a process of change as well and thus demand periodic 
adjustment. The relationship of civilian leaders and the uniformed military has often been 
adjusted to reflect alterations in the strategic environment, the nature of warfure, domestic 
politics, sociocultural trends, and the capabilities and institutional values of the military 
and the civilian institutions that control that relationship.23 
All of these arguments stress the need to mitigate the power of the military as 
22 For an analysis of the "garrison state" hypothesis see Harold Lasswell, ''The Garrison State 
Hypothesis Today," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Samuel Huntington (New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading. MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
23 For a detailed discussion of the changing nature of civil-military relations see Finer. 
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though that power were inherently evil. That view is shared by Harold Lasswell. He 
considers ''the possibility that we are moving toward a world of'garrison states'--a world 
in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society."24 He cites 
Auguste Comte's historical progression of states through military, feudal, and industrial 
phases and Herbert Spencer's military (based on force) and industrial (based on contract 
and free consent) ideal types. Further, he speculates that it is possible to imagine the 
emergence of a military state in an era of modem technology. He forecasts that the 
military state will emerge under the control of a new type of military officer who has 
become educated and experienced in civilian management skills. Ironically, in this 
scenario, the state may be sowing the seeds of its own destruction. This leads to the 
"paradox" of a militariz.ed modem state with a military controlled by civilian style 
managers. 25 It was this blurring of traditional roles that was the harbinger of Charles 
Dunlap's American Military Coup of 2012.26 
While Lasswell quotes Herbert Spencer to support his historical progression 
argument, historian and sociologist Otto Hintze examined Spencer's ideal types and drew 
a different conclusion. Hintze contended that the military and industrial ideal types are at 
opposite poles and that nations at times will move closer to one pole or the other 
24 Harold Lasswell, "The Ganison State," American Journal o/Sociology, (January 1941): 455. 
2S Ibid., 457-458. 
26 For an exploration of the potential for a military coup in the United States and bow "subjective" 
civilian control can create the environment in which it might occur, see Charles J. Dunlap, ''The Origins 
of the American Military Coup of2012,'' Parameters (winter 1992-93): 2-19. 
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depending on the external security threat. His premise is that external forces have a 
greater impact on state structure than internal or social forces. 27 While his point of view 
must be considered in the context of pre World War I Europe, it is useful to consider that 
both internal and external forces influence the degree of military influence on state 
structure. 
Hintze's perspective dovetails with both Huntington's and Finer's in that there are 
two forces interacting in civili-military relations: threats to security (external and external 
factors) and socially dominant forces, ideologies, and institutions (internal forces). Based 
on these factors a question emerges: what are the effects of periodic changes in the 
importance of one factor over another? In the presence of an external military threat and 
large military budgets, it may be easier for civilian officials and military officers to remain 
separate and focused on their respective areas of expertise. One of the most convincing 
examples of this is the case of the United States during the Second World War. Despite 
the unprecedented military buildup during that period, the supremacy of civilian authority 
over the military was never in question. 28 Conversely, in the subsequent apparent absence 
of immediate security concerns and budget cuts, both actors may find themselves in 
increasingly overlapping roles. Again, the United States provides an example. In contrast 
to the Second World War, U.S. CMR during the post-cold war era have been plagued 
27 See "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in The Historical Essays of Otto 
Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 183-193. 
28 Michael C. Desch, "U.S. Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order," in U.S. 
Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition? eds. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew 
(Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 171. 
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with problems.29 The problem may be more acute for nations in the process of 
transitioning from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Current CMR theory-either the 
Huntington or Structural Realism schools-does not accept that the internal and external 
forces that impact a nation may lead to a civil-military relation that is to a greater or lesser 
degree integrated. Rather it prescn"bes physical and ideological separation as the only 
acceptable model. 
B. CRITIQUE OF SEPARATION THEORY 
From Rebecca Schiff's perspective, there are two :fundamental problems with the 
current theory of separation: 
First, the current theory is derived largely from the experience of the 
United States, and assumes that American institutional separation should be 
applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention. It will be 
argued, however, that the American case is grounded in a particular 
historical and cultural experience-and may be inapplicable to other 
nations. Second, the current theory argues for the separation of civil and 
military institutions. In fact, institutional analysis is the theory's 
centerpiece. Yet this methodology fails to take into account the cultmal 
and historical conditions that may encourage of discourage civil-military 
institutional separation. 30 
To discuss civil-military relations theory in general is to discuss American 
civil-military relations. While Huntington's landmark The Soldier and the State was not 
the first or only major analysis of American civil-military relations following the Second 
29 Ibid., 173-174. 
30 Schiff: 7-8. 
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World War, it has had the greatest impact. This has been reinforced, at least in part, 
because the U.S. military has generally endorsed its conclusions and has used it as a primer 
for CMR training.31 
In his introduction to The Soldier and the State, Huntington acknowledges how 
both internal and external factors have shaped American civil-military relations. Written in 
the context of 1957 Cold War security concerns, he notes how the nature of C:MR has 
changed based on the unique historical and social experiences of the United States. Prior 
to World War Il, ''the primary question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is most 
compatible with American h"beral democratic values?' In a bipolar world with a clear 
national security threat, the question is: "what pattern of civil-military relations will best 
maintain the security of the American nation?'32 
By 1991, however, Huntington had moved beyond theory, and with an eye on 
emerging democracies, he prescn"bed steps to be taken to establish firm civilian control 
over potentially threatening military institutions abroad. Interestingly, many of these 
prescriptions are anything but examples of "objective civilian control.33 This creates a 
dilemma. IfHootington's theory was developed to address American CMR transitioning 
31 Feaver, 158. 
32 Huntington, The Soldier and fhe State, 3. Although the book examines the cases of Germany and 
Japan, it attempts to answer the question: what is the optimum CMR for the United States? 
33 See Huntington, The Third Wave, xv, 141, 149, 162, 231, 251. On page xv, Huntington states, " ... at 
five places in the book I have abandoned the role of social scientist, assumed that of political consultant, 
and set forth some 'Guidelines for Democratizers. "' Guidelines include: prior to the coup, cultivate 
support of the generals; following the takeover, purge all potentially disloyal officers, including those who 
supported the return to democracy; move the military out of the capital to the frontier; and buy toys for the 
military to keep them content. This hardly sounds like his preferred method of objective control. 
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from an environment of low ·external security threat to one of a higher threat, while 
considering the incomparable historical and hberal traditions found there, is it reasonable 
to assume that the same theory of separation would apply to nations moving from former 
authoritarian regimes to more democratic ones and with vastly different historical, social, 
and political experiences? Huntington's prescriptions seem to acknowledge that 
conditions abroad merit a different approach to controlling the military than the U.S. 
approach. Here it would appear that Schiff has made an accurate indictment. 
Undoubtedly, Huntington's vast body of work over a long period of time, 
combined with long-standing and broad-based acceptance of his theory, is testimony to the 
value of his work. However, as Peter Feaver has noted, "his theory is best considered a 
point of departure rather than a stopping place in the study of American civil-military 
relations. "34 More work is needed in CMR theory to account for other cases without the 
unique set of circumstances found in the United States. Feaver continues: 
The civil-military problematique, as I have defined it, is about the delegation of 
responsibility from the notional civilian to the notional military. It is about 
increasing or decreasing the scope of delegation and monitoring the military's 
behavior in the context of such delegation. And it is about the military response to 
delegation, desire for more delegation, and even occasional usurpation of more 
authority than civilians intended. A serviceable theory of civilian control should 
address the conditions under which delegation happens and identify hypotheses 
about factors that shape the delegation in observable ways. 35 
Further, Feaver comments that the theory should transcend the concept of 
professionalization as this concept does little to explain the problem of civilian control. 
34 Feaver, 158. 
JS Ibid., 168-169. 
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One additional critique is worth considering. U.S. civil-military relations have 
changed over time depending on any number of factors. As we have seen, theoretical 
treatments of CMR have not changed much during the past 40 years. However, the 
context in which CMR emerged has changed dramatically. In the United States, tensions 
between civil authority and the military have ebbed and flowed with the presence or 
absence of a clearly defined threat. Civilians have consciously or unconsciously vacillated 
between objective and subjective control techniques. Military leadership has at times 
adhered to the ''professional" ethic or abandoned it to protect institutional prerogatives. 
While the nation has never endured a military coup, the nature of the relationship and the 
degree of civilian control has been in a constant state of flux. Current CMR theory simply 
does not account for this fluid dynamic.36 
As the purpose of this thesis is to test a relatively new and significantly different 
type of CMR theory, this chapter bas attempted to clearly explain the current, dominant 
theory, and to show that it is not universally useful. While various schools of thought 
have been explored, separation has emerged as the dominant prescription for the United 
. States and all democracies. In my critique of this theory, I have shown that the theory is 
based on the experiences of the United States at a particular point in time. I argue that not 
only is it problematic to apply the U.S. model to other nations, but also that the theory 
does not account for variations in the civil-military relationship within the United States. 
36 Paul Bracken, ''Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or 
Transition eds. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, D.C.: The Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 1995), 171. 
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Schifrs theory of concordance appears all the more attractive since it allows for variation 
and accounts for the American model as well. 
21 
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m. SUMMARY OF CONCORDANCE THEORY 
A. INTENT OF THE THEORY 
Compared to Samuel Huntington's near half-century of popular acceptance, 
Rebecca Schiff' s theory has only developed over the last five years and remains rather 
obscure. To date her theory of concordance has yet to be fully explored in book length 
and the theory has only been published in two places. Yet, she is one of few authors to 
offer a theory that radically challenges Huntington's assumptions rather than simply 
modifies his approach. It could be argued that the reason that her theory has remained 
unembraced is because it has not yet been fully developed and that she has only tested it 
against the cases of India and Israel.37 
In response to Feaver's challenge in the preceding chapter, this thesis attempts to 
broaden the number of cases tested and to develop the theory more broadly. In this 
chapter, I will endeavor to articulate as clearly as possible Schi:ff's theory. Some of 
Schiff's definitions are underdeveloped and vague. Ahhough I do not intend to interpret 
what she has proposed, at various junctures it may be necessary for me to make educated 
guesses as to what she intended. If that is the case, I will indicate where I have deviated 
from her published material. 
Unlike current CMR theocy--with focus on its western-bound, dichotomous, and 
37 Schiff's theoretical work has been published in article length twice. See Rebecca L. Schiff: "The 
Indian Military and Nation Building: Institutional and Cultural Concordance," in To Sheathe the Sword, 
eds. John P. Lovell and David E. Albright (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1977), 119-130 and 
Rebecca L. Schiff: "Civil-military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed Forces and 
Society 22, no. 1 (filll 1995), 401-418. 
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institutional nature-''the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and 
shared values or objective among the military, the political elites, and society."38 
Concordance theory attempts to accomplish two objectives. First, it strives to explain 
which institutional and cultural conditions, including separation, integration, or some 
alternative relation, promote or prevent domestic military intervention. This is an 
interesting tact, as in the past integration has at times been confused with intervention. 
Second, the theory predicts that when there is general agreement among the three 
partners, the military is less likely to intervene domestically. Although Schiff does not 
make the statement, it follows that when there is not agreement among the three partners, 
then intervention should be more likely. 
The single greatest difference :from current theory is that Schiff does not assume 
separation as the only solution-she is less prescriptive and more explanative. 
Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining the military's role 
in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society. Concordance 
does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or 
decision-making process. But it usually takes place in the context of active 
agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on 
long-standing historical and cultural values. In contrast to the prevailing theory, 
which emphasizes the separation of civil and military institutions, concordance 
encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political 
institutions, and the society at large. In other words, concordance does not assume 
that separate civil and military spheres are required to prevent domestic military 
intervention. Rather, it may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political 
elites and the citizenry. Cooperation and agreement on four specific indicators 
may result in a range of civil-military patterns including separation, the removal of 
civil-military boundaries, and other variations. 39 
38 Schiff: "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 12. 
39 Ibid., 13. 
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In the following two sections, I will outline Schi:ff's definitions of the three partners and 
the four indicators. 
B. THETHREEPARTNERS 
1. The Military 
Schiff defines the military as "the armed forces and the personnel." She :further 
comments that the officers and the enlisted personnel are ''usually the most dedicated to 
the maintenance of the armed forces. ''40 While I will not suggest modifications to Schiff' s 
theory at this juncture, for the purposes of testing the theory, I need to clarify this 
definition. The military by definition includes both officers and enlisted personnel. Only a 
small proportion of the military establishment enters into the negotiation process with 
other state actors. Therefore, it is more useful to identify that part of the armed forces 
that interacts most closely with the other two partners, the officer corps or even more 
specifically the military elite. 41 For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on those 
members (generally of flag rank) of the armed forces who interact with the other partners 
and who exercise leadership and policy making. 
2. The Political Leadership 
Schiff defines the second partner-the political leadershi}:>-in terms of :function. 
What is important is to identify who represents the government and directs influence over 
40 Ibid., 13. 
41 Schiff reinforces this view later in her discussion of the composition of the officer corps. 
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the composition, support, and mission of the armed forces. Schiff argues that this is more 
important than determining the nature of governmental institutions or the methods of 
leadership selection. ''Thus, cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, 
parliaments, and monarchies are all possible forms of government elites.''42 This definition 
represents a departure from current CMR theory that assumes civilian control within the 
context of a democratic system. Schiff's theory does not require a democratic form of 
government in order for concordance to be achieved among the three partners. 
3. The Citizenry 
The citizenry or third partner is more diverse and also can be defined by function. 
A nation's citizens are a subgroup of the "civil" part of CMR. Schiff states that one must 
examine how citizens interact with the military and determine if there is agreement among 
them over the role of the military within society. Current CMR theory discounts the role 
of the citizenry and instead relies on political institutions as the mam "civil" component of · 
analysis. Because of this, current theory reflects only a portion of the CMR story. In 
contrast, concordance theory regards the citizenry as an important factor in conjunction 
with the military and political elites. In this manner, concordance incorporates additional 
elements of society that affect the role and function of the armed forces while avoiding 
undue focus on institutional analysis. 43 
42 Ibid., 14. 
43 Ibid. 
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C. THE FOUR INDICATORS 
Schiff argues that there are four indicators of concordance that illustrate the 
degree to which the political elite and the citizenry affect the role of the armed forces in a 
nation: ( 1) the social composition of the officer corps, (2) the political decision-making 
process, (3) the recruitment method, and (4) the military style. These factors do not 
represent a grand departure from current CMR theory. On the contrary, the first three 
indicators are borrowed from the current literature. The difference here is that they are 
considered within a wider historical and social context that "allows richer theoretical 
conclusions and enables better evaluation of empirical case studies. ''44 According to 
Schift: these indicators are important elements of concordance because they specifically 
reflect conditions that influence how much agreement or disagreement exists among the 
three partners. Taken within the context of historical and cultural realities, the indicators 
determine if the relations among the three partners will take the form of integration, 
separation or some other hybrid form. 
1. The Social Composition of the Officer Corps 
Schiff identifies the composition of the officer corps as a primary indicator of 
concordance. This emphasis on the professional elite of the armed forces borrows heavily 
from Huntington. 
Most modem militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of broad 
institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces; these are the 
career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the 
44 Ibid. 
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development of the military and the de:finition of its relationship to the rest 
of society. The officer is distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier, and, 
as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps can provide not only the 
critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the 
military and the government.45 
All modern militaries manifest a particular composition of the officer corps. Whereas in 
democratic societies, the officer corps usually, but not always, represents the various 
constituencies of the nation, broad representation is not a requisite for concordance. It is 
conceivable that society and the military could agree on a less representative composition. 
Schiff cites the example of India during the British colonial period where the "very 
fact that the army was drawn from particular castes and classes sets these classes well 
apart" from the "mass of Indian peasantry.''46 Accordingly, she affirms that this example 
illustrates that historical and cultural traditions prevail in nations, and that those traditions 
can affect the agreement over the composition of the officer corps.47 
2. The Political Decision-Making Process 
The political decision-making process, as an indicator, involves the institutional 
organizations of society that affect how the military operates and its satisfaction in 
general. According to Schlft: these factors include budget, size, materials and equipment, 
45 Ibid., 15. 
46 Stephan P. Cohen, The Indian Anny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 50-62. 
47 This example is problematic in that it refers to the period when India was under colonial rule and 
thus was not a nation as such. However, conditions during the colonial experience most likely did have 
an impact on civil-military relations following the attainment of statehood .. 
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and structure.48 The political decision-making process does not suggest a particular form 
of government. It is valid for democratic or authoritarian systems. Instead, it refers to the 
specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military.49 
As an example, Schiff states: 
... budgets, materials, size, and struct1ll'e are issues decided upon by open 
parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees, and political elites, and 
may involve the participation of military officers. Often the military makes 
its need known through a governmental channel or agency that takes into 
consideration both military and societal resources and requirements. In 
many countries there is a close partnership-or, in some cases, 
collusion-between the military and industry that is known as the 'military 
industrial complex.' Such a partnership may have the support of the 
citizenry, which may be persuaded that external threat conditions facing a 
nation warrant a close military and industrial relationship. The domestic 
economy may also play a role as the business sector and the citizens stand 
to gain from the creation of new industry and employment. 50 . 
What is critical is that agreement be reached by the three partners over the political 
process that best meets the requirements of the armed forces.51 
3. The Recruitment Method 
The third indicator of concordance is the recruitment method of the armed forces, 
48 This may be too narrow a list. Other factors may include: the degree of autonomy given to the 
military to advise on defense or security issues; the quality of life issues like pay, housing, entitlements, 
and pensions; and the degree to which the military is used as an instrument of social change. There are 
any number of contentious issues that could fall under this rubric. 
49 Schift: "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," IS. 
so Ibid., 15-16. 
51 While I understand that Schifrs intent is to prevent military intervention by meeting the needs of the 
armed forces, I believe that if there is really to be a partnership then the idea should be to reach agreement 
among the three partners over the process that best meets the requirements of the nation. 
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which refers to the enlistment of citizens into the military. Recruitment may be either 
coercive or persuasive. 52 Under a system of coercive recruitment, men and supplies are 
forcibly obtained while demands are made upon the citizenry, through taxation and 
conscription, to provide for the needs and obligations of the military. Because such 
demands are often harsh and citizens are forced to cooperate against their will, this form 
of recruitment does not normally allow for concordance between the military and the 
citizenry . 
. Persuasive recruitment is based on the belief: among the citizenry, that the sacrifice 
of military service is needed for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other national 
cause. Enlistment in the armed forces may be either voluntary or involuntary. In this 
form, the government does not need to coerce the population into military service when 
they ''willingly offer themselves" by volunteering or accepting the need for enlistment. 53 
Persuasive recruitment occurs when the three partners reach agreement or concordance 
over the requirements and composition of the armed forces. 
4. The Military Style 
The final indicator of concordance is military style. This factor represents an 
original aspect of Schiff's theory. It is also the most difficult to articulate. Military style 
refers to a complex mix of what the armed forces look like, what people think about them, 
52 Schiff draws these forms exclusively from Samuel Finer's, "extraction-coercion-persuasion cycle," in 
"State and Nation-Building In Europe: The Role of the Military," The Formation of National States in 
Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 96-98. 
S3 Ibid. 
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and what guiding beliefs drive them. Schiff explains why this indicator is so important: 
Style is about the drawing of social boundaries or their elimination. It is 
the mode by which members of particular elites associate with each other 
as peers and differentiate themselves from the members of other elites and 
the members of non elite groups. It is important because it reflects how 
something appears; and appearance stands as a symbol that can, by the 
nature and force it conveys, connote a type of power and authority. 
Military style deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the 
armed forces. How the military loo~ the overt and subtle signals it 
conveys, the rituals it displays--these are all part of a deep and nuanced 
relationship among soldiers, citizens, and the polity. 54 
One may well ask: so what? Schiff has hit upon a variable that is at the same time almost 
intangible and yet so much a part of militaries everywhere-how symbolism and ritual 
pervade the relationship of the military to other sectors of society. These symbols and 
rituals form part of the history and culture of the nation; they bestow upon the military a 
sense of respectability, professionalism, separateness, and cohesiveness. They affect the 
nature of the officer corps, the methods of induction into the military, and the institutional 
processes that determine the needs and requirements of the armed forces. 
Having descn'bed Schiff's four indicators, a series of questions present themselves. 
How do the four indicators work together? How much agreement or disagreement is 
required to prevent military intervention or precipitate a coup? How do we know if 
concordance has been achieved? 
Schiff's work to date does not adequately address these questions. However, she 
never states that there must be absolute agreement among the ''three partners" in order to 
have concordance. Rather, she indicates that the greater the degree of discordance that 
54 Schiff: "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered," 17. 
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exists, the greater the likelihood that the military will attempt a coup. Added to this is the 
very problematic issue of attempting to measure or quantify something as intangible as 
agreement or disagreement in the minds of the ''three partners." The best that we can 
hope for is to look for conditions that will illustrate that such relationships exist. For the 
purposes of my analysis, I propose that evidence of disagreement between any two of the 
"three partners," with respect to any of the four indicators, is sufficient but not necessary 
to create a coup attempt. Further, as the disagreement expands to other indicators, the 
risk of intervention should increase. That risk would increase further still if both the 
military and the citizenry disagreed with the political leadership as the military may view 
such support as justification for intervention. None of these propositions is clearly 
identified by Schiff. However, they seem to have intuitive merit and certainly do not run 
counter to her hypotheses. 
In the chapters that follow, I will analyze the case of Argentina to determine 
whether concordance theory can account for the instances of military intervention as well 
as the absence of military coups following the subsequent returns to democracy. 
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IV. THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA 
At the heart of concordance theory, is the idea that a nation's historical and 
cultural experience conditions the degree to which civil-military relations manifest more 
separate or integrated forms. Recent international events illustrate that ethnic 
orientations, nationalism, and multicultural diversity are root causes of domestic unrest 
found throughout the world. Concordance theory (a) seeks to operationalize the cultural 
and institutional indicators previously discussed; and (b) explains the conditions under 
which the three partners can agree on and thus prevent domestic military intervention. 
As I have discussed earlier, current CMR theory is based on the unique historical 
and cultural experience of the United States. Further, the nature of U.S. CMR has 
changed over the years as a result of both internal and external circumstances. This 
chapter will briefly analyze the unique historical and cultural experience of Argentina in an 
effort to illustrate how it is different from that of the United States. Since it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to fully evaluate the entire histories of both nations, I will limit my 
discussion first, to the distinct differences between the United States and Latin America in 
general, and second, to the issue of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the cases of 
Argentina. 
While both the United States and Argentina are located in the New World, were 
former colonies of European powers, and have all evolved into what are generally 
accepted as democracies, the nature of those experiences have been significantly different. 
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Additionally, if Schiffs theory is universally applicable, then each may have developed a 
civil-military relationship that is more or less integrated or separated depending on their 
degree of agreement among the ''three partners" with respect to the four indicators of 
concordance. Simply put, a model of CMR developed to explain the civil-military 
situation in the United States may not be a suitable model for other nations. 
A. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORTH AND LATIN AMERICA 
While it is by definition true that each Latin American nation is unique, it is equally 
true that generaliz.ations can be drawn based upon a common Iberian heritage that sets 
them apart from their North American counterparts. As Carlos Fuentes says, ''the 
three-thousand-mile border between Mexico and the United States is more than a border 
between Mexico and the United States: it is the border between the United States and all 
Latin America, for Latin America begins at the Mexican Border."55 As one of the 
foremost and most prolific of writers on Latin American heritage, Fuentes makes a strong 
argument for the differences in the historical, cultural, and social experiences and realities 
between the United States and Latin America 
In his published lecture Latin America at War with the Past, Fuentes suggests that 
we should try to bridge our differences while at the same time not deny that they exist. 
This point goes the heart of Schiff's contention that current CMR. theory attempt to 
impose an essentially ethnocentric view of civil-military relations upon nations with 
55 Carlos Fuentes, Latin America at War with the Past, (Montreal, Toronto, New York, London: CBC 
Enterprises, 1985), 7. 
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distinctly different backgrounds and conditions. Further, while he does not address CMR 
issues directly, he explains why it is in the nature of North Americans to assume the bias 
that others would be well served to follow their example. The problem is that the 
development of the United States and Latin American countries has followed different 
paths. 
In the first part of his lecture, Fuentes makes a series of opposing statements which 
serve to highlight the broad gulf that separates the United States from Latin America: 
It is the only frontier between the industrializ.ed and the developing worlds. 
It is the frontier between two memories: a memory of triumph and a 
memory of loss ... lt is the frontier between two cultures: the Protestant, 
·capitalist, Nordic cuhure, and the southern, Indo-Mediterranean, Catholic 
culture of syncretism and the baroque. 56 
Traditions at the time offounc:ling have also led to different structures. The United 
States ''was born in perfect consonance with the values of modernity: the wedlock of 
religion and economics; free enterprise; free inquiry; self-government; skepticism; 
criticism; division of powers, checks and balances; federalism. Conversely, Latin America 
was born of conditions in discord with these same values: the refusal of modernity; royal 
absolutism; dogmatism; the Holy Inquisition; prolongation of the Holy Roman order; the 
divorce between the religious man and the economic man; rigid ecclesiastical societies; 
centralism. 57 
Like Fuentes, Claudio Veliz also sees the effects of the continuity of tradition on 
56 Ibid, 8. 
57 Ibid., 10-11. 
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the development of Latin America In his work The Centralist Tradition of Latin 
America, Veliz offers that scholars and statesmen alike are disillusioned and perplexed by 
attempts to· reform, modemiz.e, revolutionize, or transform the nations of Latin America. 
He attnbutes this to the misguided notion of the applicability of Northern experiences and 
models to conditions in the South. 
I am convinced that this is a result of the mistaken belief that the 
experience of the industrialized countries of northwestern Europe and the 
interpretive models derived from it ate precisely applicable to the peoples 
of the southern regions of the New World. I am also convinced that the 
proliferation of authoritarian regimes during the last few years is not an 
aberration of moral and political taste, but a manifestation of a style of 
political behavior, a secular disposition of Latin American Society that 
under different forms---of which the military may well prove the most 
transient-will be with us for some time yet. The main hypothesis 
presented in this work affords a basis for these assertions. This hypothesis 
is founded on the description and analysis of the principal fuctors that 
distinguish the social, economic, and political character of Latin American 
Society from that of the countries that share in the northwestern European 
tradition. These fuctors have had a decisive influence on the genesis and 
formation of Latin American society: they are also of contemporary 
importance and will, I believe, continue to be of major significance in the 
future.SS 
Veliz cites four fuctors that are inversely related to the "centralist" character of Latin 
American social and political arrangements: (1) the absence of the feudal experience from 
the Latin American tradition; (2) the absence of religious nonconformity and the resulting 
latitudinarian centralism of the dominant religion; (3) the absence of any occurrence or 
circumstance over time that could conceivably be taken as the counterpart of the 
European Industrial Revolution; (4) the absence of those ideological, social, and political 
ss Claudio Veliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 3. . 
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developments associated with the French Revolution that so dramatically transformed the 
character of western European society during the past century and a half. 59 
Throughout the remainder of the book, Veliz descn"bes how the centralist tradition 
has become manifested in the current day: the appearance of authoritarian regimes, capital 
cities as the centers of power, weak political party systems, and disproportionately strong 
presidents. While he acknowledges the difficulty in making broad generaliz.ations, he 
states, ''this should not obscure . the :tact that they have much in common that is of 
definitive importance in the construction of their present and their future.'~ 
While it may be true that culture is not a deterministic fitctor, it is certainly true 
that a nation's history and cultural experiences must condition how they interpret the 
world around them and impact the nature and form of the institutions they develop. 
Likewise, it is reasonable to acknowledge that a theory of CMR, based on the conditions 
and experiences of the United States may not provide the only possible model for the 
nations of Latin America to emulate. 
B. THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
ARGENTINA 
The case that I have elected to evaluate, Argentina, is considered to be a 
prototypical example of the bureaucratic authoritarian type of political system. For that 
reason, it seems obligatory to address the issues raised by it. For Argentine political 
59 Ibid., 3-4. 
60 Ibid., 15. 
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scientist Guillermo O'DonneR bureaucratic authoritarianism emerged (BA) emerged as a 
response to the crisis of populism that came to dominate the politics of Argentina under 
Juan Peron (1946-1955) and of Brazil during the presidency of Getlllio Vargas 
(1930-1945 and 1950-54). At the end of the so-called easy stage of import substitution 
industrializ.ation (ISi), having reached the limits of the domestic market, populism 
confronted serious problems. Rising inflation and balance of payment difficulties 
undermined the economic gains made by the urban middle and working classes and hence 
eroded the viability of the populist coalitions on which these regimes were based.61 
According to O'Donnell, due to the recent period of modernization, technocrats 
emerged from the military, state, and private sector. These technocrats sought to attain a 
dominant position within the coalition. This new group of elites attributed the crisis to the 
threat of political activation within the popular groups and technocrats in both Brazil and 
Argentina encouraged and supported military coups. The new regimes moved to exclude 
and deactivate the popular sectors by instituting authoritarian repression and reorienting 
the economy according to technocratic conceptions of economic growth. 62 
0 'Donnell sees weakness in making legitimate a nation that relies on transnational 
capital while excluding popular sectors from political participation He states that it is the 
fear of the threat oflower-class mobiliz.ation during populism that creates the environment 
in which an alliance may be formed between the upper bourgeoisie, the technocrats, the 
61 Peter F. Klaren and Thomas J. Bossert, Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin 
America (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, 1986). 237-238. 
62 Ibid. 
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suppliers of transnational capital, and the military. However, he envisions this alliance as 
basically unstable and suggests a variety of alternatives including forms of limited 
democracy. 63 
Although this aspect of Argentine history will be analyzed in greater detail in the 
next two chapters, it should be said here that Schiff s theory of concordance may account 
for the occurrence of the coups that occurred in that country. It is very possible that the 
reason that the coups transpired is that there was not general agreement among the three 
partners with respect to at least two of the indicators Schiff has identified, specifically, 
"the composition of the officer corps" and ''the political decision-making process." In 
both cases it is probable that the military desired to enhance the nmnber of technocratic 
members of the officer corps and that a populist based regime was opposed to this. It is 
also likely, that following the easy phase of ISI, that the military was not receiving the 
funding for modemiz.ation that they felt was required. While this represents only a cursory 
look at the issue, I would argue that concordance theory is not necessarily negated by the 
emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in my test case. Additionally, the 
admission by O'Donnell that these regimes were inherently unstable tends to suggest that 




V. EVALUATION OF CONCORDANCE THEORY IN ARGENTINA 
A. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION 
For the purposes of evaluating Rebecca Schiff s theory of concordance in the case 
of Argentina, I propose to examine two different time :frames: the period of military coups 
prior to the return to democracy in 1983 and the period since Argentina has joined 
Huntington's "third wave" of democratization (1983 to present). If concordance theory is 
valid and predictive, then one would expect to find that, during this period of coups, there 
was general disagreement, or discordance, between the "three partners"--the military, the 
political elite, and the citizenry-with respect to the four indicators-composition of the 
officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. 
Further, one would expect to find that it was this discordance that led to multiple military 
interventions. Likewise, following the return to democracy in 1983, one should find that 
concordance had been reached and has been maintained among the ''three partners" and 
has to date prevented further military intervention despite a legacy of periodic military 
takeovers. 
That being said, there is little direct data that specifically addresses Schiff s four 
indicators. However, it is possible to derive from anecdotal evidence and various political 
and social data what the degree of agreement may have been and currently is between the 
''three partners." 
Since Schiff contends that historical experience is important to concordance theory, it 
seems appropriate to look at the five decades leading up to Argentina's return to 
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apparently lasting democracy. It is a1most a paradox that a country as wealthy, urbaniz.ecl, 
literate and in most respects developed as Argentina should have suffered military 
administration for so much of its recent history. Military intervention over the decades has 
been the rule rather than the exception, as Deborah L. Norden points out: 
To the casual observer, military coups and rebellions appear to be discreet 
events. Coups explode on the political horizon with a drama that contrasts 
starkly with the usual subtleties and intricacies of political change. Yet the 
drama is deceptive. Military coups come :from a complex series of 
conditions and organizational maneuvers. In Argentina, they are also part 
and product of a pattern of chronic interventionism, unique among the 
more advanced countries of South America. Argentina's military 
interventionism stems :from both a civilian predilection to seek military 
allies and the military' s tendency to respond. 64 
George Philip has commented on the same phenomenon. 
Yet it would be quite wrong to see the country as suffering under a military 
jackboot :from which it longed to break :free. Quite the contrary; military 
regimes in Argentina have never governed, and have rarely sought to 
govern, without substantial social support. Military desire to avoid 
complete isolation, which played a decisive part in the decision to call 
elections after the Falldands defeat, has been no less consistent a feature of 
its political role as has its constant assumption of government. Where the 
military has ruiecl, it has done so with the support of civilian allies (and not 
always the same civilian allies); indeed, so common has been the sight of 
civilians calling for military intervention that Argentines have a phrase to 
descn"be it: 'knocking at the doors of the barracks'.65 
Both Norden's and Philip's propositions support my contention about 
concordance theory :from Chapter ill, which holds that military intervention is more likely 
if the military and the citizenry both disagree with the third "partner," political leadership. 
64 Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln and 
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B. THE ERA OF MILITARY COUPS 1930-1983 
After overthrowing the government in 1930, the military governed (either directly 
or indirectly) for the next fifteen years in alliance with civilian conservatives, under a 
:fraudulent yet formally democratic system. In 1943, the civilian govermnent was about to 
declare war on Germany. The officer corps divided under pressure from the United States 
and widespread institutional loyalty to the Nazis. Axis sympathizers within the armed 
forces staged a coup. Within this vacu~ Colonel Juan Per6n built a base within 
organized labor for the political opening which was becoming inevitable. Once democratic 
elections were held in 1946, Peron won the presidency. He was reelected in 1951 but 
overthrown in 1955 by an officer corps concerned with his tendency toward personalistic 
autocracy. For the next decade their efforts were focused on preventing his return from 
exile. During this period the military found support in the older, displaced political parties 
that now wanted their chance to govern. Between 1955 and 1966 there were two miliriity 
interregna and two periods of presidential rule by different factions of the Radical Party. 
Argentine political society was split into Peronist and anti-Peronist factions. 66 
In 1966, General Juan Carlos Ongania seized power from Arturo 11.lia, in the fifth 
coup in Argentina since 1930. The previous four interventions had followed what Alfred 
Stepan refers to as the ''moderator pattern." Wrth the encouragement of civilian elites, the 
military would stage a coup in order to relieve what they considered a crisis situation and 
always with the understanding between civilian and military elites that the military would 
66 Ibid., 625. 
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relinquish control of the government to a civilian administration after a short interval. 
This time things were quite different. 67 
The Ongania regime seized power With no intention of returning to civilian rule for 
a ten to fifteen year period. On this occasion, the military had an agenda other than 
providing stability until a civilian government could retake the reins of power. Rather, 
their intent was to reshape Argentine society through a three-phased plan of economic, 
social, and political change. The serious nature of the transformation envisioned by the 
military regime was illustrated by the name given to it, ''The Argentine Revolution".68 
However, the coup did follow one form from those of the past. This time the 
armed forces enjoyed broad-based public support. The previous Illia administration had 
entered office with no mandate and only 25 percent of the vote. Rather than attempting to 
broaden his base of support, he narrowed it with economic policies that discouraged 
agricultural investment and with political strategies aimed · at dividing and co-opting 
organized labor.69 A survey taken within a week of the June 1966 coup showed that a full 
66 percent of the population was satisfied with the change in government. Yet another 
survey indicated that over 77 percent thought that the coup was necessary. Wrthin two 
years, 70 percent of those surveyed considered the Ongania regime to be equally bad or 
67 Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979 (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1995), 16. 
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worse than the prior Illa administration. 70 
This disillusionment eventually revealed itself in the radicaliz.ation of society and 
armed struggle. However, this was not a result of Ongania's economic plan and the 
pafuful results of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Rather, radicaliz.ation had 
political causes. Bureacratic-authoritarianism, in the 1966 Argentine context, was 
characterized by a relatively low level of threat prior to the coup. This led to a 
consequently low level of state repression. 71 The Ongania regime was known as a 
dictablanda, or benign dictatorship. What was not benign, however, was Ongania's 
genuine belief in his duty to reshape society and "remoralize" his country. Besides banning 
political activity and parties and instituting severe economic policies, Ongania's regime 
became a moral campaign with conservative religious overtones. Books were burned, 
"red light" districts were closed down, and the country was entrusted iilto the care of the 
Virgin Mary. The military staged several attacks on the nation's universities. This was 
counter to the prevailing cultural attitude in Argentina and contnbuted to the 
commencement of armed struggle by various organiz.ations. 72 
Throughout this period, the military managed to avoid some accountability for the 
economic problems that the nation endured. Ongania limited to a large degree the 
military's political participation. In many respects the Ongania regime followed the 
70 Moyano, 16-17. 
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personalistic pattern of other Argentine heads of state more so than that of a military 
dictator. Throughout the 1966-73 period, civilians continued to dominate the 
administrative. structure of government. In cabinet posts, the military never surpassed 25 
percent and the number of military officers in the top strata of the government hovered 
near 11 percent of all positions. Therefore, actual military participation remained low 
enough to prevent stigmatization by the regime's fuilures. 73 
DuriI)g the Ongania regime the military became more unified, largely due to 
government moderation in incorporating officers into political and administrative 
positions. In contrast, under the administration of General Alejandro Lanusse, that fragile 
unity began to deteriorate. Lanusse, an army cavalry officer like Ongania, inspired dissent 
from two sectors within the military: the nationalist and the more apolitical 
professionalist. Most active in resisting the Lanusse regime were a group of pro-Per6n, 
nationalist colonels who were caught organizing a coup in 1971. That same year there 
were nationalist uprisings in the military garrisons of Azul and Olavarria. Other sectors 
opposed Lanusse from a professionalist perspective, on grounds that the general had 
become too politicized. His political behavior included the excessive favoring of personal 
allies and members of his cavalry branch of the army and his pursuance of political goals.74 
In Spite of this, organized opposition within the military was negligible. There was 
general agreement that the military regime must continue in order to allow for the 
''recuperation of constitutional normality." Whatever internal antagonisms existed were 
73 Norden, 40-41. 
74 Ibid., 41. 
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overridden by a shared perception of anti-Peronism, fear of communism and the increase 
in guerrilla activities through the 1960's and 1970's. The fear of guerrilla violence was 
stronger than the fear of Peronism. Peronism was no longer viewed as the most 
dangerous alternative to the military government and Peronists began to be viewed as 
potential allies in the ''war" against the guerrilla groups. 75 
Lanusse meed a state of general unrest. Strikes increased in response to a 
continued steep rise in the cost of living, and there were many kidnappings for ransom, as 
well as murders by both the Peronist guerrillas know as the Montoneros and Marxist 
groups such as the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP). Still, elections were scheduled 
for March 1973, and, in preparation, bans on political parties and activities were lifted in 
April 1971.76 The Peronists enjoyed a resurgence of popularity, particularly among the 
urban working class, women, youth, and the rural middle sectors. 77 It rapidly became 
evident to the Lanusse regime that efforts to demystify Peron had been in vain. Still the 
regime sought to impose conditions on the transition. 78 
The most significant of the limitations on the new government did not come from 
the Lanusse administration but. from the military hierarchy as a whole. In a document 
known as Los Cinco Puntos (The Five Points), signed by all active duty generals, military 
75 Ibid., 41-42. 
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leaders specified their demands for the incoming government. Included in their list was 
the requirement to comply with the constitution, laws, and ''republican institutions." The 
government ·warned against the granting of amnesty to suspects and convicts associated 
with the guerrilla groups. Further, it advised the new government against a reinstitution of 
the Peronistic tendencies of the past and called for continuing the fight against 
subversives. Finally, the document demanded that the military hierarchy not be altered. 79 
Still, the transition appears to be a pacted one, with the military having a somewhat 
disproportionate say in the nature of the change in government. 80 The Five Points were 
almost immediately challenged by the new regime. 
The Peronist coalition nominated Hector J. Campora as a stand-in for Peron who 
was still in exile. Elections, held under a new law that strengthened the presidency, took 
place on March 11, 1973. Campora won the election with 49 percent of the vote. Along 
with that success, Peronists gained 11 of 22 governorships and 60 percent of the seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies. In June 1973, Peron returned to Argentina and campora 
resigned to make way for his idol to rule directly. Had he not resigned, the military would 
likely have deposed him. In elections held in September 1973, Per6n won with a clear 
majority. His wife, Maria Estela Martinez de Peron (Isabelita) was elected vice-president. 
79 Ibid., 44-45. 
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Continued unrest and political Violence led Peron to begin to favor the political Right. 81 
If the military had been initially apprehensive about leftist support for Peron, the 
newly elected president was quick to display his opportunism by appealing to the 
institution that would most likely cut short his return to power-the military. During his 
first two terms in office, Peron had presided over a large military buildup, faster 
promotions, and a significant increase in the military-controlled defense industry. He had 
attempted to open the officer corps to new entrants and had tried to impose Peronist . 
doctrine within the ranks. Through careful personnel changes, he sought to create a 
military establishment personally loyal to himself. 82 Other Peron policies were more subtle 
and symbolic. 
After 1973, besides the requisite laudatory speeches aimed at the military, Peron 
made an effort to elevate the prestige of the armed forces as well. Following his 
readmission to the Army, he wore his uniform for his first public reappearance as an 
indication of his respect and pride in the Argentine military. Since symbolism and prestige 
have frequently tended to be more important to the armed forces than concrete benefits, a 
theme that would be again demonstrated in the post-1983 period, such actions 
significantly enhanced Peron's standing with the military.83 
Peron's manipulation of the military was not, however, limited to symbolic 
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gestures. He once again renewed his efforts at de-politicization of the officer corps. His 
attempts to secure control of the military through the promotion system provoked the 
resignation of all three service chiefs and decimated the army and navy high commands. A 
former opponent and head of military intelligence was forced into resignation. Even the 
army connnander in chief: General Jorge Carcagno, was removed due to the president's 
fear of his popularity. Peron's efforts to establish "subjective" control over the military 
were short-lived as he died within a year of his return to the presidency of Argentina. 84 
Isabel Peron's rise to the presidency marked the denouement of the Peron era. 
Faced with problems that only worsened following the death of her husband, her 
administration sank into ineffectiveness and inaction. It was only a matter of time before 
another coup would be greeted by many with a sense of collective relief.85 Isabel Peron 
was even more inclined to appoint military leaders on the basis of their political 
sentiments. Army chief of staff General Elbio Anaya was replaced by General ~.,T.:"na 
Laplane, a supporter of"integrated professionalism," a doctrine that commits the military 
institution to the government's political views. Under intense pressure from all three 
· branches of the armed forces, the president was eventually forced to call for his 
resignation and replace him with General Jorge Videla, a more traditional professionalist. 86 
The coup d'etat that brought down Isabel Peron in 1976, differed in pattern from 
84 Paul W. ,Zagorski, ''Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy," Armed Forces and Society 
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previous military takeovers. First, the coup was a carefully calculated affair and included 
all of the armed forces. A committee of representatives from all three services met for 
months prior to the coup to draft the political plan of the Proceso de Reorganizacion 
Nacional (Process of National Reorganization). Second, the new military government 
was a junta comprised of senior officers from the army, navy, and air force. This stood in 
contrast to the personalistic style and more politically motivated general-presidents of the 
past. Finally, the military coup of 1976 was the most ''professionalist" case of military 
intervention in Argentine history. The leaders of the coup were clearly from the political 
mainstream of the military hierarchy rather than from the extreme Right or Left. They 
were apparently reluctant to instate military rule despite support from various members of 
the political community. A coalition was only consolidated after members of the military 
were thwarted in their attempts to provoke impeachment proceedings against Isabel 
Peron's adn:tlnistration. 87 
This apparent unanimity of vision and purpose was to be short-lived. By the early 
1980s, the problems that :fuced the several military governments that followed Isabel 
Peron's regime were almost insurmountable. The threat of terrorism had been largely 
defeated, but only at an inordinately high cost of widespread human-rights abuses that led 
to significant public protest. In 1981 the economy was in recession and by 1982 witnessed 
a negative growth rate of 6 percent of Gross Domestic Product. The nation, which had 
run up extensive debt in the 1970s, meed even greater economic pressure as the loans fell 
87 Ibid., 50-53. 
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due in the 1980s. All of these calamities were faced by military officers ill-equipped to 
address them. 88 
Within the military itself, significant rifts had developed. Following four years of 
military government, the new military president, General Roberto Viola, was himself 
overthrown and succeeded by the maneuver's organizer and then army chief of sta:tI: 
General Leopoldo Galtieri. The new president apparently harbored ambitions of 
continuing in the office of the president following a transition to civilian rule and was. 
unable to control the other service chiefs or dominate the armed forces altogether. Thus, 
military factionalism became more intense during this period. 89 
Military adventure provided the Galtieri administration with an option to dealing 
with serious domestic issues, and in the absence of an internal threat, he focused the 
military and the nation on external issues. We now know that the Argentine military had 
already decided upon a policy of increased international belligerence at the time of the . 
Galtieri takeover. To a certain degree, it was largely a matter of chance that the 
Falklands/Ivfalvinas islands would be their first target. 
By the end of March 1982, the Galtieri regime had become increasingly bellicose 
with Chile over the long-lasting Beagle Channel dispute. Argentina had semiofficially, 
despite sharp diplomatic protest, laid claim to half of Paraguay. In an attempt to gamer 
favor, the administration publicly offered proxy troops to help the United States in Central 
America. Galtieri apparently thought that a strong pro-United States stand on other 
88 Zagorski, 421. 
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matters would be sufficient to protect his regime from reaction to a Falklands/Malvinas 
seizure. He was later quoted by journalists as saying that he considered himself"the spoilt 
child of the Americans.•'90 
For a military establishment that had for the last half century focused on internal 
security threats and dabbled at political leadership, the reality of war against the militarily 
sophisticated British was a rude awakening. Nationalist fervor was short-lived as 
promises of national triumph turned into evidence of disaster. On 14 June 1982, General 
Mario Menendez surrendered at Port Stanley, just 74 days following the seizure of the 
islands by the Argentines. The military defeat completely discredited the regime and, this 
time, the armed forces were stigmatized by the failure of the military government. The 
regime fell into turmoil and elections originally planned for January 1984 were brought 
forward to October 1983. In order to protect the institution, the armed forces held the 
elections hostage long enough to allow for convalescence and to pre-empt civilian 
demands for vengeance. It was a period of self-preservation. 91 
C. FOLLOWING THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY 1983 
In the aftermath of the war, Galtieri and the three service commanders were forced 
to resign and a retired General was appointed as a caretaker president. Now concerned 
about the possibility of prosecutions of military officers as a resuh of the "dirty war" 
against the guerrillas during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the armed forces attempted to 
90 Philip, 630-631. 
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pass a self-amnesty law, only to see it later rescinded. Although there was some pressure 
from within the ranks of the military to perpetuate the military regime, elections were held 
and a new civilian government assumed power in December 1983.92 
Amid the turmoil a non-Peronist candidate for president emerged. Although a 
member of the Radical Party, Raw Alfonsin was not a mainstream member. The vote in 
October 1983 was a vote for the man rather than for the party. He had led a splinter 
group of party members against the position of the cautious and conciliatory relationship 
with the former military junta. He had openly opposed the military tactics employed 
during the "dirty war" and was one of very few prominent leaders to condemn his 
country's invasion of the Falldands/Malvinas when it took place. This political stance 
made him the party favorite in the post war election period. 93 
As the newly elected president, Raw Alfonsin had distinct advantages over 
previous civilian presidents. The new administration found itself able to rely on a general 
willingness among almost all sectors of society to give it an opportunity to prove itself. 
The military lacked the cohesion and morale to threaten the government in the short term. 
Alfonsin had won a majority of the vote in an open presidential contest, the first time a 
Peronist presidential candidate had been defeated in an election. Therefore, Alfonsin was 
neither hostage to the Peronists nor the anti-Peronist military.94 
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Alfonsin's strategy for dealing with the military was two-pronged: to punish those 
guilty of serious human rights violations and to reform the structure of the armed forces. 
In this manner, Alfonsin distinguished between the military as a valuable institution in need 
of reform and the specific officers who had committed serious crimes, and argued that the 
prosecution of the guihy officers was not intended to impugn the dignity of the armed 
forces as an institution. 95 He essentially expected the military to cooperate with him 
because, in the long-term, he had their best interests at heart. 
Alfonsin pursued a strategy of gradual doctrinal change, while avoiding 
politicization and wholesale restructuring. He attempted to develop a new role for the 
military based on a nonpolitical version of professionalism. This new role rejected the 
military's prior vision of national security doctrine that was focused on internal threats to 
the polity and embraced the traditional Western concept of defense against foreign threats. 
Despite opposition from the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, a new defense law was 
passed in October 1986. The act officially relegated internal security to a civilian police 
:function. 96 
Key to Alfonsin's strategy for the professionaliz.ation of the military was the 
de-linking of the military or military :factions from their allied civilian cliques. This is a 
crucial issue since, as we have seen, the military is most likely to intervene with the tacit or 
explicit consent and encouragement of civilian sectors. In a 1985 Armed Forces Day 
9S Ibid., 423 
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speech, Alfonsfn identified the duplicity shared by both groups in the promotion of coups. 
The coups have always been civilian-military in character. The undoubted 
military responsibility for their operational aspects should not make us 
forget the heavy responsibility of the civilians who plotted them and gave 
them ideological basis. The coups always reflected the loss of the sense of 
legality inherent in society, not just the loss of the sense of legality in the 
milit ~ ary. 
Statements like these became a persistent theme in Alfonsfn's relations with the armed 
forces. 
Alfonsfn was never able to wrap up his proposed exchange of technical 
modemiz.ation of the armed forces for prosecution of human rights violators and 
subordination to civilian authority. The most :important roadblock was military opposition 
to human rights trials. One thousand officers were suspected of human rights violations. 
Trials, therefore, represented a serious challenge to the armed forces as an institution. 
More importantly, in terms of military style, such trials struck at the heart of the military's 
self-image as protector of the nation. Rather than cooperate with the president, the armed 
forces defended their actions in the "dirty war" as a justified response to forces that 
threatened the. survival of the country. While the military demanded immunity, military 
courts refused to prosecute. 98 
Alfonsfn' s attempt to separate those guilty of human rights violations and the rest 
of the armed forces blew up in his face. Rather than isolating a group of guilty senior 
~ Zagorski, 423. 
98 Paul W. Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces Wlder the 
Menetn Government," Armed Forces and Society 20, no. 3 (spring 1994): 424-425. 
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officers and ex-officers, his newly appointed high command became isolated from the 
junior officer corps. While the high command was willing to accept the rights trials and at 
least did not . oppose military restructuring, middle-level and lower-level officers grew 
intolerant of what they viewed as a government psychological campaign against the armed 
forces and of the high command's inaction and lack of leadership regarding the issue of 
trials.99 
This rift within the military led to three military revolts in April 1987, December 
1987, and in December 1988. In each of these rebellions, lieutenant colonels and colonels 
led mutinies and demanded government concessions including the cessation of rights trials, 
pardons for those officers already convicted, and the appointment of a new high command 
sympathetic to the views of the rebels. While publicly the government proved able to face 
down the mutineers, the rebels were able to stop further trials and secured a shakeup of 
the top command structures. 100 
While the legacy of the Alfonsin government had been a political-military 
stalemate, his successor, Carlos Menem, who assumed power in July 1989, sought to 
avoid the fute that had be:tallen Alfonsin. Menem moved quickly to pardon the military 
mutineers. This act only heightened the perception of civilian vulnerability to military 
provocation. However, :from the perspective of the armed forces, the pardons capped off 
a successful drive by elements within the military to end what they saw as a campaign of 
99 Ibid., 425. 
100 Paul W. Zagorski, Democracy versus National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 100-112. 
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judicial persecution waged against them. It a1so illustrated that civilian strategies of 
confrontation with the military would not work. Menem used the appointments of ltalo 
Luder and Humberto Romero, his first two ministers of defense who enjoyed close ties to 
the armed forces, to signal his desire for a more amicable relationship with the military. At 
the same time, however, the military was subjected to one of the steepest budget cuts in 
Argentine history. IOI 
During the first four years of the Menem presidency defense budgets either 
declined or remained stagnant. Even after an economic recovery in 1991, defense 
spending lagged behind the nation's general growth rate for goods and services. Requests 
of the armed forces lost out to other claims on public-sector :finances. Unlike Alfonsin, 
Menem did not attempt to punish the armed forces politically. Rather, he insisted that 
they not interfere with the nation's larger macro-economic objectives. Simply put, the 
military was asked to make do with less just as the rest of Argentine society had been 
called upon to do.I02 
In order to offset the effects on readiness and morale, the Menem government 
made a serious attempt to restructure the military and to modernize the force. This 
restructuring had a direct impact on the high command. Over a five year period, the 
numbers of general and flag officers were cut between twenty-five percent and thirty 
percent. Additionally, Menem altered the criteria for the general officer promotion list 
101 Pion-Berlin, 108-109. 
102 Ibid., 125-126. 
58 
submitted by the high command. While keeping traditional criteria of past assignment and 
perfonnance of duty, he added the exclusion of officers who had participated in the 
December 1990 coup and who did not support his economic and foreign policies. Over 
forty colonels were eliminated on these grounds. 103 
The modernization of the Argentine armed forces has had a significant impact on 
professional military tradition in that country. Law nwnber 24.429, entitled Servicio 
Militar Voluntario (Voluntary Military Service), promulgated on 5 January 1995, 
regulates military service in Argentina. The law establishes a voluntary military service yet 
reserves for the congress the right to conscript 18-year-olds for a period of service not to 
exceed one year. Such conscription may be ordered when, for enunciated reasons, an 
inadequate number of volunteers present themselves for military service. Prior to this law 
enlistment was involuntary. 104 
Officer recruitment has changed. Traditionally, the officer corps was drawn from 
the military academies. Now, officers are drawn :from other sources as well. Promotion is 
based on examination rather than solely on seniority. A new emphasis is being placed on 
the reserve officer corps and should have the effect of drawing on a more diverse base of 
recruits. Noncommissioned officer recruitment will additionally draw on even more 
nontraditional sources of talent. The entire effect is to institute an officer corps along the 
North American model. This reformed corps is less of a closed caste, with few ties to the 
103 Zagorski, ''The Armed Forces Under the Menem Government," 428. 
104 Conscientious Objector Status for Selected Countries. Online. htto://www.serve.com/pec/campaigns/ 
co.html. 22 November 1998. 
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civilian world, than at any time in modem Argentine history. 105 
D. ARGENTINA AS A CASE OF CONCORDANCE? 
As I indicated at the opening of this chapter, for concordance theory to be both 
valid and predictive, then prior to the current era of democratic rule, one would expect to 
find that there existed general disagreement among the ''three partners"-the political 
elite, the military, and the citizenry-with respect to the four indicators identified by 
Schiff. Likewise, following the return to democracy in 1983, we expect to find that 
concordance has been reached and that it is this state of agreement among the ''three 
partners" that has prevented a return to military government. In this section I will 
evaluate the historical record in an effort to determine if that is indeed the case. 
1. The Social Composition of the Omcer Corps 
Schiff identifies the composition of the officer corps as a primary indicator of 
concordance. While in most democratic societies the officer corps usually represents the 
various constituencies of the nation, broad representation is not a requisite for 
concordance. What is important is that historical and cuhural traditions prevail in nations 
and that those traditions can affect agreement over the composition of the officer corps. 
The first thing that stands out is that prior to the current area of democracy, 
Argentina was not democratic and its officer corps was not representative of society. 
Officers were drawn exclusively from the military academies. The military in general and 
105 Zagorski, ''The Armed Forces Under the Menem Government," 429. 
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especially the officer corps had very few ties to civilian sectors. It is difficult to assess if 
there was general agreement among the three partners with respect to the composition of 
the officer corps during this period. However, composition was based on the cuhural and 
historical traditions of the nation up to that point in time. There is much evidence to 
suggest that the officer corps certainly viewed themselves as a distinct and separate class 
from the rest of society. Another problematic issue is that at any given time during this 
period of history it was difficult at best to differentiate between the senior officers and the . 
political elite. They both competed for the same goal-political power. We can say that 
there was at least some disagreement between the military and the political elite at various 
junctures in this time period with regard to this indicator of concordance. 
Following the return to democracy, the Menem government has adopted the North 
American model for selecting and educating officers from a broader societal base. 
However, it is hard to say that this has widespread support among the "three partners." 
The evidence suggests that this is more a strategy on the part of the political elite to 
reform the officer corps into a more manageable institution. For the sake of argument, 
one can a least say that the ''three partners" do not disagree on this indicator of 
concordance. 
2. The Political Decision-Making Process 
The political decision-making process, as an indicator, involves the institutional 
organizations of society that affect how the military operates and its satisfaction in 
general. According to Schifi: these fuctors include: budget, size, materials, and structure. 
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The political decision-making process does not suggest a particular form of government. 
It is valid for democratic or authoritarian systems. Instead, it refers to the specific 
channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military. The question is: do the 
"three partners" agree over the political process that best meets the needs of the military? 
Before the current era of democracy, one would have to conclude that the question 
is irrelevant because the military determined its needs and allocated the funds as it saw fit. 
The military did not need to reach agreement with the other partners. During periods of 
direct military rule, the political elite and the citizenry were not in a position to oppose the 
military. At other times the threat of military intervention allowed the military to assert 
their prerogatives with or without public or political support. Thus, prior to the 
reintroduction of democracy in 1983, it is impossible to determine whether this is an 
indicator of concordance. Pressed to make a call, I would have to say that although there 
was not general agreement among the partners, other factors may have been at play. 
Following the transition to democracy, the issue of concordance is clearer. Under 
the Alfonsin government, there obviously was not agreement among the partners with 
·respect to the political decision-making process. While Alfonsin clearly enjoyed the 
support of the citizenry in his efforts to restructure the military, the officer corps balked on 
the unrelated issue of trials over human rights violations. This led to the three revolts and 
a political-military stalemate between the military and the government. Still, it was not the 
issues of budget, size or material that led to the deadlock. Rather, it was the issue of a 
perceived attack on the military as an institution that led to the threat of intervention. This 
point was reinforced by what transpired during the early years of the Menem 
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administration. Menem reduced the military budget, cut the size of both the force and the 
officer corps and at the same time shifted control of the military budget away from the 
high command and into the Ministry of Economics. Yet it appears that the military, while 
not liking it, have accepted their fate for the good of the nation. From Schiff's perspective 
this could be viewed as concordance. From another point of view, however, it could be 
said that issues of budget, size, and material are not as critical indicator as concordance 
theory would suggest. 
3. The Recruitment Method 
The third indicator of concordance is the recruitment method of the armed forces, 
which refers to the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces. Recruitment may be either 
coercive or persuasive. Generally, coercive recruitment does not normally allow for 
concordance between the military and the citizenry. Persuasive recruitment, by definition, 
indicates that a state of concordance exists. 
As we have seen in this chapter, Argentina had a persuasive (albeit obligatory) 
recruitment method during both periods examined. 106 However, since the advent of Law 
number 24.429 in January 1995, the method has become completely voluntary and follows 
the North American model. Once again, a comment is due here about the efficacy of 
recruitment method as an indicator. Since the recruits are heavily drawn from the 
Argentine underclass, they generally represent a group that is not politically powerful 
106 See page 30 of this thesis for Schiff's explanation of how persuasive recruitment may be either 
volwitary or involuntary. 
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enough to matter. Thus, it is again uncertain that this is a relevant indicator of 
concordance. 
4. The Military Style 
The final indicator of concordance is military style. This refers to a mix of what 
the military looks like, what people think about it, and what guiding beliefs drive it. As an 
indicator, military style attempts to determine how symbolism and ritual pervade the 
relationship of the military to other sectors of society. These symbols and rituals form 
part of the history and culture of the nation; they bestow upon the military a sense of 
respectability, professionalism, separateness, and cohesiveness. They affect the nature of 
the officer corps, the methods of induction into the military, and the institutional processes 
that determine the needs and requirements of the armed forces. 
In the period from 1930 to 1983, it could be convincingly argued that the military 
style was difficuh to differentiate from that of the political elites. It was a period of 
authoritarian presidents and military governments, all equally unsuited to the task of 
governing the nation. The military ritual that was repeated time and again was the regular 
intervention into the political realm The military saw itself as a coequal partner in the 
political game. Senior military leaders would ally themselves with either civilian or 
political elites to oust the incumbent government at will. They were at once a symptom of 
and a contnbutor to the general state of lawlessness that existed prior to the transition to 
democracy. In symbolic terms, the military certainly viewed itself as the guardians of the 
nation. Almost every intervention or human rights violation was justified by their 
64 
overriding obligation to restore order out of chaos and to protect the ''paper" democracy 
from the socialist threat. In that this was the widely accepted state of affitirs during this 
period, it must be said that concordance was the norm. However, at the points just prior 
to each coup of the period, a state of disconcordance existed between the military faction 
that initiated the coup and the political elite in charge at the time. 
Following the return to democracy in 1983, both the military and the civilian 
administrations were predisposed to redefine the traditional roles of the military. This is 
not to say that the transformation was immediate, as the various revolts under Alfonsfn 
indicate. However, under Menem, it appears that the military, the political elites, and the 
citizenry were able to agree that economic considerations should dominate. This gave the 
administration the ability to reduce the armed forces through budget cuts and force 
reductions while convincing the military that they should endure their share of the burden 
for the good of the nation Changes in officer recruitment, training and selection for 
promotion combined with a clearly defined external defense orientation should help to 
solidify this change in military style. This may represent a turning point in Argentine 
civil-military relations. 
Given the analysis presented here, it would appear that by testing Schiff's theory of 
concordance against the case of Argentina, the theory generally holds up. There are, 
however, several problematic aspects of concordance theory which I will address in my 
conclu5ions. I am not convinced that in the case of Argentina there are clearly delineated 
criteria that differentiate between the three partners. This problem is highlighted by the 
evidence of the indistinguishability between political, civilian, and military elites at various 
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junctures of my examination. Further, I am not comfortable that the four indicators 
selected by Schiff accurately measure the likelihood for the occurrences of military coups. 
As I have discussed, often military coups are the result of other, more pertinent factors. 
Yet, there is an aspect of the theory that resonates with reason: that the civil-military 
relation that a nation manifests at any given point in history, is at least conditioned by its 
historical and cultural experiences. In the closing chapter, I will address these and other 
issues in an attempt to rehabilitate this intriguing theory. 
66 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The case of Argentina presents a host of problematic issues for the student of 
civil-military relations. The purpose of this thesis was to challenge the prevailing 
assumptions of current C.MR theory and to test a new theory against the case of 
Argentina. A long-standing assumption of current C.MR theory is that of a dichotomous 
relationship between civilian and military spheres. Domestic military intervention is 
prevented if civilian institutions are in control of and maintain a check over a professional 
military. Domestic military intervention is more likely if civilian institutions do not exist or 
are too weak to control the armed forces. 
This thesis sought to challenge these basic assumptions and, to a certain degree, 
:fuiled. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Argentina prior to the 1983 return of 
democracy witnessed the existence of a military institution that viewed itself as a coequal 
political partner. The historical pattern that had been set was one in which the armed 
forces habitually entered into pacts with both civilian and political .elites in order to seize 
power or to exercise control over the government decision-making. Following the 
democratization of Argentina after 1983, that dynamic has changed due to the widespread 
stigmatization of the armed forces in the wake of their :fuilures in governing, their defeat in 
the Falklands!Malvinas war, and their abuses of power during the "dirty war." The 
Menem government was able to significantly reduce the size of the military organization, 
gain control over the military budget process, and begin to model the armed forces after 
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the U.S. example. All of these facts tend to support the current theory of civil-military 
relations. 
However, Argentina's historical and social experiences make the period from 1930 
to 1983 difficult to explain in terms of separation theory. During the colonial period, 
when the military emerged as the first unified national force, the armed forces and society 
as a whole fell into a pattern of military interventionism. At the same time the nation 
adopted a centralized power model usually headed by a populist president. The ruling 
ability of these disproportionately powerful presidents was equally bad regardless of 
whether they were civilian or military. It was virtually impossible to distinguish between 
elites among the military, civilian, or political sectors. The military intervened in politics 
more out of traditional habit than because of the weakness of civilian institutions. In fact, 
as we have seen, civilians often conspired with the military to replace elected presidents. 
Yet, once that paradigm was altered by the cumulative effects of the Falldands/Malvinas 
debacle, the human rights abuses of the "dirty war," and a failed economic plan, the way 
was paved for permanent alterations in the civil-military power relationship. As Argentina 
experiences a continued pattern of democratic electoral transitions and its institutions 
habituate themselves to operating within the confines of a new politico-historical context, 
then the likelihood that the military will reenter the political arena will gradually dissipate. 
The second purpose of this thesis was to test Rebecca Schiff's theory of 
concordance against the case of Argentina. As one of the few new attempts to seek 
alternatives to the concept of separation, I had hoped to find that this theory would better 
explain both the occurrence of military interventions prior to the return to democracy and 
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the lack of intervention since 1983. While it superficially appears that Schiff's theory 
holds true in the case of Argen~ I contend that concordance theory works, but for 
different causal reasons. 
B. CRITIQUE OF CONCORDANCE THEORY 
1. The Three Partners 
My primary argument with concordance theory is a methodological one. Simply 
put, I am not certain that the phenomena observed in the case of Argentina (or in Schiff's 
cases of Israel and India) are necessarily the result of agreement or disagreement among 
the ''three partners" with respect to the four indicators of concordance. Here I will divide 
my critique between both the concept of the three partners and Schiffs four indicators. 
I have to challenge Schiff' s belief that society can be neatly subdivided into what 
she calls the ''three partners." It is not clear to me that her definitions descn"be distinct 
societal subgroups or that these groups interact as partners in the political realm. First, 
Schiff defines the military as "the armed forces and the personnel" She makes no 
distinction between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. Further, she does not 
differentiate between a military elite and the remainder of the officer corps. This is 
problematic in that the armed forces are not a monolithic organization. Not only are they 
divided by service (army, navy, and air force), they are also separated by hierarchy. Only a 
few senior officers interact with other political actors. The composition of this elite 
changed over time in the case of Argentina. At times the senior leadership of the high 
command sought to intervene in the political realm out of military institutional interests. 
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Sometimes, intervention was based on the individual quest for political power of an 
individual officer or group of officers. In yet other instances the military hierarchy was 
changed from outside the institution by overly powerful presidents and another military 
elite was created from officers of lesser rank. My point is that it is next to impossible to 
identify who the military elite is for the purposes of testing the theory. 
Schiff identifies the political elite in terms of their function. Cabinets, presidents, 
prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchies are all possible forms of 
government elites and thus exercise influence over the armed forces. The problem with 
this definition is that, at least in the case of Argentina, military officers could be added to 
the list of political elites. In the fifty year history of military interventionism examined in 
this thesis, military elites were virtually indistinguishable from political elites. They were, 
at various times, one and the same. Even when not directly exercising political power, 
they exercised power indirectly through coercion and threat of intervention. 
Schiff holds that a nation's citizens form a subgroup of the "ciyil" part of CMR. 
Concordance theory regards the citizenry as a coequal partner with the military and 
political elite. If the military is not a monolith, then the citizenry is a.ti even more diluted 
societal component. In a centralized political system with a historical predisposition to 
personalistic presidents, it is difficult to view the citizenry as a political player that matters. 
In fact, during the long decades of authoritarian rule, the citizens vote counted for little 
and their support often led to military intervention and continued authoritarian rule. Once 
again, in the case of Argentina, I must argue that only certain elite members of civil society 
are able to negotiate with elites of the military and political sectors in order to agree on the 
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role of the military within society. 
2. The Four Indicators 
My main argument with Scbiff's four indicators of concordance is that they do not 
appear to measure the likelihood of military intervention or of a coup attempt. The four 
indicators outlined in Schiff's theory include: the social composition of the officer corps, 
the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and the military style. In 
this section I will examine each of the four indicators in an effort to illustrate this 
methodological weakness. 
Schiff identifies the social composition of the officer corps as a primary indicator 
of concordance. She highlights the role of the officer corps in defining the relationship 
with the rest of society and in providing links to the citizenry and the government. A 
problem with this indicator is that no specific composition is required for concordance to 
occur. The officer corps may be either representative of the greater society or not, so long 
as the three partners agree on the composition. This indicator is problematic in that even 
if there were agreement between the three partners, this would not necessarily mean that 
the military is less likely to intervene in the political arena. In fact, from a bureaucratic 
politics perspective, one would expect that once a member of the officer corps, the 
individual officer will manifest the ideology of the institution. Therefore, an officer's 
social background is of little consequence once he has spent a career seeking to gain a 
higher position within the hierarchy of the armed forces. 
The political decision-making process, as an indicator of concordance, involves the 
71 
institutional organizations of society that affect how the military operates and its 
satisfaction in general. The process does not suggest a particular form of government. 
Instead, it refers to the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the 
military. What is critical, according to Schiff, is that agreement be reached by the three 
partners over the political process that best meets the requirements of the armed forces. 
In the case of Argentina, this indicator fails to measure concordance because for much of 
its history, the military elite determined its requirements without the need to consult with 
the other societal partners. Following the return to democracy, the armed forces were not 
in a position to negotiate from the same position of power because as an institution the 
military had been discredited. What they did negotiate for was not budget, size, material, 
or structure, rather, it was for immunity from prosecution in human rights trials. 
The third indicator of concordance is the recruitment method of the armed forces. 
Given that, in the case of Argentina the recruitment method of the military was persuasive 
both before and after the return to democracy, there is little to analyze here. Although, 
since the method had become completely voluntary as of 1995, there is greater evidence of 
concordance now. According to Schlfl: persuasive recruitment is only possible in the 
presence of concordance between the three partners. Still, I am not convinced that ifthere 
were not agreement among the partners over this indicator, there would be sufficient 
causation to lead to a military coup. If there were a significant security threat to the 
nation and the military was not able to respond due to an inability to draft sufficient 
manpower, then there might be cause for a coup. However, this scenario is a dubious 
cause for military intervention, since in the presence of a clear threat to the survival of the 
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nation, the military would most likely have little difficulty obtaining recruits. 
The :final indicator of concordance is military style. This factor represents what the 
military looks like, what people think about it, and what guiding beliefs drive it. As an 
indicator, military style attempts to determine how symbolism and ritual pervade the 
relationship of the military to other sectors of society. These symbols and rituals form 
part of the history and culture of the nation; they bestow upon the military a sense of 
respectability, professionalism, separateness, and cohesiveness. They affect the nature of 
the officer corps, the methods of induction into the military, and the institutional processes 
that determine the needs and requirements of the armed forces. While all of this makes for 
interesting discussion, the problem from a social science perspective is how to measure the 
degree of agreement over this indicator of concordance. Even if this indicator was more 
carefully defined, would disagreement among the three partners over the military style, be 
sufficient to cause the armed forces to initiate a coup? I am not sure. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
The one part of concordance theory that seems to hold promise is its core 
· arg(unent against current civil-military relations theory.· Unlike current CMR 
theory-with a focus on its western-bound, dichotomous, and institutional nature-the 
theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or 
objectives among the military, the political elites, and society. Concordance theory 
attempts to accomplish two objectives. First, it strives to explain which institutional and 
cuhural conditions, including separation, integration, or some alternative relation, promote 
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or prevent domestic military intervention. This is an interesting tact, since in the past 
integration has at times been confused with intervention. Second, the theory predicts that 
when there is general agreement among the three partners, the military is less likely to 
intervene domestically. Although Schiff does not make the statement, it follows that when 
there is not agreement among the three partners, then intervention should be more likely. 
As I have discussed at length in Chapters III and IV of this thesis, current CMR 
theory has its own limitations given that it was developed to explain U.S. civil-military 
relations. It is almost unthinkable that current CMR theory would apply without 
modification in a Latin American case. Yet, in the case of Argentina, Huntington's 
prescription for separation and professionalization of the military seems to have worked in 
the period since 1983. However, it would be unlikely that such prescriptions would have 
been viable in the period prior to the return to democracy, due to the historical and 
cultural context of the time. 
I argue that each nation must find its own way to democratic forms. Once 
memories of old patterns of authoritarianism have been supplanted by more democratic 
experiences, then concordance will have the opportunity to .take hold. Given this set of 
circumstances, one can envision a modified theory of concordance. Schiff may be on the 
right track when she considers the concept of three partners, but the theory needs to be 
modified to include only elites within each sector, those who are in a position to negotiate. 
For indicators of concordance I would suggest the following based upon my analysis of 
the Argentine case: (I) Do the elites agree that the way the military is structured, trained, 
equipped, and led is appropriate to the level of threat the nation faces? (2) Do the elites 
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agree on the roles and functioris of the military within society? (3) Do the elites agree on 
the type and nature of civilian control exercised over the military? If the elites among the 
citizenry, the military, and the political sectors can answer yes to each of these questions, 
then one might be able to say that concordance has been achieved and that the likelihood 
of military intervention has been mitigated. 
Separation theory has provided CMR theory with a base for over five decades. 
What is now needed is additional theoretical work on the military's withdrawal from 
political power. The case of the United States is not sufficient to address the issues raised 
by a transition from authoritarian rule. Rebecca Schiff has at least attempted to develop a 
new framework. It does not yet meet the obligations of a theory. Yet, she has identified 
the problems in the existing theory and pointed the way towards helping to keep newly 
founded democracies and even older democracies safe from the interventions, coups, and 
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